[PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
authorLee, Chun-Yi <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:37:59 +0000 (18:37 +0800)
committerSalvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Sun, 3 Oct 2021 20:14:52 +0000 (21:14 +0100)
commit198a5abbd44272deefa3d2ff4c665cb10b28678d
tree6e09fa209fc3eb7406bbadcd547cf814fbd996a7
parent47b4b4c73a7669ed0680e0f62136e7da561fb231
[PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled

Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933173/

The mok can not be trusted when the secure boot is disabled. Which
means that the kernel embedded certificate is the only trusted key.

Due to db/dbx are authenticated variables, they needs manufacturer's
KEK for update. So db/dbx are secure when secureboot disabled.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.5.9:
 - get_cert_list() takes a pointer to status and returns the cert list
 - Adjust filename]
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: Refresh for changes in
38a1f03aa240 ("integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate
routine")]

Gbp-Pq: Topic features/all/db-mok-keyring
Gbp-Pq: Name 0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c